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CHAPTER 14 
Land Use Planning Law 
JULIAN J. D' AGOSTINE and RICHARD G. HUBER 
A. ZONING 
§14.1. Creeping zoning and large lots: Validity. A rural com-
mumty, when subject to the pressure of suburbanization, will un-
derstandably react to limit its population increase and to channel what 
development does occur. One of the most popular devices used is 
creeping zoning. In this method, several residential zones are set 
up, the smaller lot-size zones adjacent to the present population 
centers and the larger lot-size zones further out. Thus development 
presumably will first occur in areas zoned for small lots, near present 
municipal services, and the speed and public cost of development will 
be held to a satisfactory minimum. 
A creeping zone system was the subject of dispute in Aronson v. 
Town of Sharon.1 The petitioner's land was zoned as rural residen-
tial, requiring lot sizes of one hundred thousand square feet and 
frontage of two hundred feet. Although three other residential dis-
tricts were created by the local zoning by-law, with considerably 
smaller size and frontage requirements, the attack on the by-law was 
not based upon the creeping zone system. It was contended that the 
large lot requirement made the petitioner's land unusable and thus 
constituted an uncompensated taking rather than a reasonable regu-
lation of the landowner's rights in his land. 
Simon v. Town of Needham,2 nationally recognized as a leading 
case, upheld one-acre lot zoning under the predecessor of present 
General Laws, Chapter 40A, Sections 2, 3. The Supreme Judicial 
Court there recognized that the improvement and beautification of a 
town in harmony with its natural characteristics and the promotion 
of the physical and spiritual values inherent in low density living 
would, at least in conjunction with other statutory purposes, support 
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petition and its decision must contain a definite "statement of rational 
causes and motives, founded upon adequate findings." 
§14.3. Variances. A number of variance cases were decided by 
the Supreme Judicial Court during the 1964 SURVEY year. Bouchard 
v. Ramos1 concerned the granting of a variance to a property owner 
whose property was partially in a business zone and partially in a resi-
dential zone. The Board of Appeals of New Bedford granted a vari-
ance to allow the erection of a portion of a supermarket on that por-
tion of the premises zoned for residential use. The Court adjudged 
the action of the Board as beyond its authority and again emphasized 
that the party receiving the variance has the burden of establishing 
through evidence that the Board met the requirements of General 
Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 15(3). The Court further stated that the 
hardship required by the statute must be more than the fact that the 
land in question is less valuable because it borders on zone boundaries, 
which prevents its entire use for business. 
In Smith v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Scituate,2 the Court was 
concerned with the validity of a variance allowing a residential dwell-
ing to be nearer the street line than was allowed by the zoning law. 
The Court set aside the variance on a very familiar ground, viz., that 
the person seeking the variance and the board ordering the variance 
failed to produce sufficient evidence on a de novo hearing in the 
Superior Court that the statutory prerequisites of General Laws, 
Chapter 40A, Section 15(3), had been met and that the variance was 
justified. The case should stand as a grim reminder that zoning by-
laws, including setback and side-line requirements, should be 
carefully examined and followed, since a building erected in 
violation of these laws, whether consciously or unconsciously, is not 
entitled to relief by means of a variance. The obvious hardship, 
necessarily incidental to this type of case, is not the hardship required 
under Section 15(3), as such a violation "cannot be made a fulcrum to 
lift the restriction imposed by these by-laws." 
In Twomey v. Board of Appeals of Worcester,8 the Board granted a 
variance, finding that all the enabling act conditions had been estab-
lished. The Supreme Judicial Court held, however, that the Superior 
Court failed to find in the de novo hearing the existence of all these 
conditions. The Court held that when the evidence is reported, 
the Court may supply the omitted finding if there is evidential support 
for it. Such, however, was not the case here. The Twomey case 
points up the necessary requirement that the record of the Superior 
Court trial must contain sufficient evidence to establish the Section 
15(3) requirements. 
§14.4. Failure to give notice to town clerk: Void appeal. Under 
the provision of General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 21, a party 
§14.8. 1846 Mass. 423, 198 N.E.2d 691 (1963). 
21964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1115,200 N.E.2d 279. 
81964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1038,199 N.E.2d 682. 
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appealing the decision of a Board of Appeals to the Superior Court 
must file the bill in equity within twenty days after the decision has 
been filed in the office of the town or city clerk. The statute also re-
quires that within the same twenty-day period notice of the filing, with 
a copy of the bill in equity, is to be given to the town or city clerk so 
as to be received within the prescribed period. In the case of Lincoln 
v. Board of Appeals of Framingham,1 the aggrieved party failed to 
give notice of the bill in equity until after the twenty-day appeal 
period had expired. The Court held that, as the exclusive remedy is 
a statutory appeal, failure to comply with the statute rendered the 
appeal void. 
§14.5. Validity of zoning laws: Jurisdiction of the Superior Court. 
In Sisters of the Eoly Cross of Massachusetts v. Town of Brookline,1 
it was held, among other points, that (save on a petition for a declara-
tory decree by the Attorney General under General Laws, Chapter 
40A, Section 22) on petitions for declaratory decrees the Land Court 
has exclusive jurisdiction, under General Laws, Chapter 185, Section 
1(j 1/2), to determine the validity of a zoning by-law. 
The Supreme Judicial Court commented that the foregoing con-
clusion was not affected by the language of Section 22 of Chapter 40A, 
conferring "jurisdiction upon the Superior Court to enforce zoning by-
laws adopted pursuant to the enabling act." Of Section 22 the Court 
further commented " ... it is a grant of specific equity jurisdiction and 
must be strictly construed." 
On the basis of the language just quoted, it has been urged that 
on a bill in equity to enforce a town by-law under Section 22, the 
Superior Court must enforce the by-law without determining if it is 
in compliance with the zoning enabling act, whereas it may also be 
urged that the decision is limited to petitions for declaratory relief. 
Assuming that the contention urged is adopted, what recourse has 
the respondent landowner ~n a Section 22 proceeding in opposing 
the enforcement of a zoning ordinance or by-law that he believes to 
be invalid? He must have some recourse or else Section 22 would have 
to fall as denying him due process. It is suggested that if the re-
spondent landowner believes that the ordinance or by-law for which 
enforcement is sought is invalid, he should seek a stay in the proceed-
ings and immediately petition the Land Court for declaratory relief 
under General Laws, Chapter 185, Section 1(j 1/2). Armed with a 
favorable final decree of that court which is left standing on appeal, 
he should be able to secure a dismissal of the Section 22 proceeding. 
The foregoing comment is limited to the enforcement provision of 
Section 22. It appears that in proceedings under General Laws, 
§14.4. 1346 Mass. 418,193 N.E.2d 590 (1963). 
§14.5. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 807, 198 N.E.2d 624, also noted in §11.6 supra. 
2 Caputo v. Board of Appeals of Somerville, 330 Mass. lO7, 113-114, III N.E.2d 
674, 677 (1953). 
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Chapter 40A, Section 21,2 and in mandamus3 the Superior Court has 
jurisdiction to determine the validity of zoning by-laws. 
§14.6. Validity of zoning laws: Economic loss of owner. In An-
derson v. Town of Wilmington,1 the owner of 3.4 acres of land 
located in a single residence district petitioned the Land Court under 
General Laws, Chapter 185, Section 10 1/2), and Chapter 240, Section 
14A, to determine the validity of the by-law as it was applied to the 
locus. He claimed that it was invalid because the land in question 
was marshy and not economically suitable for residential development. 
The Land Court upheld the by-law. The Supreme Judicial Court 
sustained the action, stating that the by-law had a substantial and 
reasonable relation to the public welfare of the town. The Court 
further stated that the burden is on the landowner to show that a by-
law is invalid,2 and in the present case the fact that the by-law did not 
permit the owner to realize maximum profits from the use of the land 
was not of itself a sufficient cause to invalidate the by-Iaw.3 The 
Court distinguished the case of Barney & Carey v. Town of Milton,4 
in which a by-law was held invalid, stating: 
As in the Barney & Carey case ... the present petitioners' land 
is partly marsh and the cost of developing this land for residential 
housing would be substantial. But here the similarity ends. In 
the present case, the petitioners' land is not isolated; the aerial 
photograph shows that there are several homes in the immediate 
vicinity. There is nothing in the record to indicate that if the 
petitioners' land were developed for home sites, a market for 
this land or for the homes that could be built thereon would be 
lacking, nor is there any reason for us to conclude that the land is 
substantially better suited for nonresidential uses. The zoning 
by-law before us does not appear to have been adopted only be-
cause of aesthetic considerations .... 5 
§14.7. Validity of zoning laws: Nonconforming uses. In Massa-
chusetts Broken Stone Co. v. Town of Weston,1 the Supreme Judi-
cial Court considered an appeal by the petitioner from a Land 
Court decision made under General Laws, Chapter 185, Section 
10 1/2), and Chapter 240, Section l4A, on its petition, in which the 
validity of the by-law was challenged regarding the placement of the 
3 Atherton v. Selectmen of Bourne, 337 Mass. 250, 256, 149 N.E.2d 232, 235 (1958), 
noted in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§14.2, 14.5. 
§14.6. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 585, 197 N.E.2d 682. 
2 The Court cited Pierce v. Town of Wellesley, 336 Mass. 517, 521, 146 N.E.2d 666, 
669 (1958). 
3 The Court cited Kaplan v. City of Boston, 330 Mass. 381, 384, 113 N.E.2d 856, 
858 (1953). 
4324 Mass. 440, 87 N.E.2d 9 (1949). 
51964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 585, 587,197 N.E.2d 682, 683. 
§14.7. 1346 Mass. 657,195 N.E.2d 522 (1964). 
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petitioner's land in a "limited industrial district." The petitioner also 
contended that certain operations from the premises were authorized as 
prior nonconforming uses. The Supreme Judicial Court sustained 
the Land Court, stating the now familiar rules, viz.: 
The burden is on the petitioner to show that the by-law is in con-
flict with the enabling act or with applicable statutory provi-
sions. . .. Every presumption is to be afforded in favor of the 
validity of an ordinance and if its reasonableness is fairly debat-
able the judgment of local authorities who gave it its being will 
prevail. .. , At most, the petitioner has proved that the by-law 
makes its land less profitable than it would be if it were in a heavy 
industrial district and that the property is suited to the petitioner's 
present or intended uses. Neither of these considerations is 
sufficient to invalidate a zoning ordinance .... 2 
The Court also sustained the detailed findings of the Land Court 
as to the pre-existing nonconforming uses and the present authorized 
uses of the premises. The decision in effect authorized the petitioner 
to bring fully crushed stone upon its premises for use in the manu-
facture of bituminous concrete and also allowed the continuation of 
quarrying, crushing, and processing of stone excavated from the 
premises and its subsequent sale, as they were a continuation of prior 
nonconforming uses. The decision, however, prohibited the peti-
tioner from importing stone to the premises for crushing and proc-
essing as this would constitute a new use of the premises, constituting 
a change in use. 
§14.8. Interpretation. In Salvation Army of Massachusetts, Inc. 
v. Board of Appeal of Boston,l the Supreme Judicial Court held that 
the use of premises located in a general residence district as a home 
for unmarried pregnant women, where they were to remain until they 
were ready to enter a Boston hospital for delivery, was permissible 
under the Boston zoning law2 as a use which was within the classifica-
tion of "educational, religious, philanthropic or other institutional 
uses." The Court went on further to state that this use was not, as 
claimed by the city, a "hospital, home for aged, convalescent home ... 
or similar use" which required special approval from both the Health 
Commissioner and the Building Commissioner of the City. 
§14.9. Jurisdiction of board of appeals: Review action of select-
men. In Bradshaw v. Board of Appeals of Sudbury,l the Supreme 
Judicial Court held that a board of appeals does not have jurisdiction 
to review the action of selectmen in granting a liquor license, not-
2 Ibid. 
§14.8. 1 !l46 Mass. 492, 194 N.E.2d 99 (196!1). 
2 Acts of 1924, c. 488, §§!I, !I(!I), 4. This act has been replaced by the new Boston 
zoning law, which went into effect January I, 1965. Acts of 1964, c. 244, amending 
Acts of 1956, c. 665, and Acts of 1957, c. 408. 
§14.9. 1 !l46 Mass. 558, 194 N.E.2d 716 (196!1). 
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withstanding the fact that the use of the premises for the sale of 
liquor would be in violation of the zoning by-law. The Court also 
observed that an "aggrieved party" can lose this status if he has moved 
from the area in question.2 
§14.IO. Public service corporation: Exemption from zoning laws. 
In New York Central R.R. v. Department of Public Utilities,l the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the Department, under General 
Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 10, may, after public notice and hearing, 
exempt a building or land to be used by a public service corporation 
from the operation of local zoning by-laws, provided such use is 
reasonably necessary for the convenience or welfare of the public not 
only in the single municipality, but in the other areas serviced by the 
railroad. This decision, however, must be accompanied by a statement 
of reasons, including a determination of each issue of fact or law 
necessary to the decision. 
§14.11. Legislation. General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 7A, was 
amended by Acts of 1963, Chapter 578, which inserted the present 
last paragraph of the section. The purpose of this amendment was 
to extend for a three-year period the freeze on plans under General 
Laws, Chapter 41, Section 81P (approval not required) for any use 
authorized under the applicable zoning by-law in effect at the time of 
submission of the plan, whereas the five-year freeze period under 
Chapter 40A, Section 5A, is limited to residential use. 
General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 7A, was amended by Acts of 
1963, Chapter 591, which inserted the last sentence now appearing in 
the first paragraph of the section. This amendment reinforces the 
five-year freeze by staying the applicability of any changes in a zoning 
ordinance or by-law during an appeal from the disapproval of a plan 
submitted before the zoning change. 
Section 7 A was again amended by Acts of 1964, Chapter 688, which 
provided that the five-year freeze for plans requiring planning board 
approval should run not from the date of approval, but from the date 
of endorsement of approval. This has the effect in some cases of fur-
ther delaying the applicability of zoning law changes to plans sub-
mitted prior to such changes. This amendment also eliminated the 
language which limited use of the land to residential construction, 
viz., "and provided further that the land shown thereon is to be 
developed for residential use," thereby authorizing construction and 
use of the lots, in accordance with the applicable zoning law then in 
effect. 
After the expiration of an applicable freeze period during which ' 
there was no change in the zoning ordinance or by-law, the owner of 
two or more adjoining lots, upon publication of notice of a planning 
2 Gamer v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Newton, 346 Mass. 648, 195 N.E.2d 772 
(1964). 
§14.l0. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 921, 199 N.E.2d 319, also noted in §1!1.8 supra. 
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board hearing on increasing lot requirements, might, under General 
Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 11, lose valuable property rights, unless 
he had obtained a building permit for each lot prior to the date of 
first publication. 
The freeze provisions of General Laws, Chapter 40A, Sections 5A and 
7 A, should probably be reinforced by amendments providing that any-
one owning adjoining lots shown on a plan, subdivision, or other-
wise, on the increasing of the lot size requirements, could build under 
the prior zoning law for an appreciable period of time after the 
effective dat.e of the new zoning requirement. 
§14.12. Nonconforming uses. Bowes v. Inspector of Buildings of 
Brockton1 upheld a Superior Court decree ordering the issuance of 
mandamus to abate a piggery on certain lands, and the piggery build-
ings, as a nuisance. The piggery, a nonconforming use, operated 
from four small buildings at the time zoning was adopted. By the 
time the present petition was brought, the piggery buildings included 
eight large wooden structures plus one good-sized cement structure. 
The Supreme Judicial Court merely quoted the statement of Justice 
Qua in Wilbur v. City of Newton2 to the effect that new buildings in 
conjunction with a nonconforming use are not authorized. The pres-
ent case represents a. simple application of the principle represented 
in more complex form in Town of Seekonk v. Anthony.s 
In Town of Maynardv. Tomyl,4 the landowners had appealed from 
a decree that additions made to their previous nonconforming use 
were in excess of what was permitted by the local zoning by-law. The 
building permit that had been originally issued authorized the land-
owners to add to the ground floor of a second dwelling on the lot and to 
construct an entire second floor. This permit was withdrawn upon 
objection from the town's board of appeals, which later issued a 
variance for the first floor addition only. The landowners, however, 
built the second story despite the restricted second building permit. 
The Supreme Judicial Court sustained the Superior Court's decree 
ordering the removal of the second floor. Arguments based upon the 
second building being an accessory use (similar to a gatehouse) and 
upon General Laws, Chapter 40A, Sections 5 and 5A, were summarily 
rejected. 
B. SUBDIVISION CONTROL 
§14.13. Endorsement of plan: Made under misapprehension. In 
Goldman v. Planning Board of Burlington,l the Supreme Judicial 
Court held that a planning board had properly refused to endorse a 
plan with the notation that approval was not required under the 
§14.12. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 577, 197 N.E.2d 676. 
2302 Mass. 38, 43, 18 N.E.2d 365, 368 (1938). 
S 339 Mass. 49, 157 N.E.2d 651 (1959), noted in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.2. 
41964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 701, 198 N.E.2d 291. 
§14.13. 1 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 613, 197 N.E.2d 789. 
7
D'Agostine and Huber: Chapter 14: Land Use Planning Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1964
§14.16 LAND USE PLANNING LAW 173 
Subdivision Control Law,2 although the planning board had previously 
endorsed with that notation a similar plan of tJ;!.e same lots, under the 
misapprehension that the lots fronted on a public way. The Court 
further stated that it would not consider on a petition for a declaratory 
judgment. the validity of the revocation of building permits for the lots 
on the first plan. The petitioner's remedy was that prescribed by 
General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 13, an appeal to the local board of 
appeals. This appeal had not been taken within the ten-day period 
specified by the zoning by-law. 
§14.14. Approval of subdivision: Public use of ways on plan. 
In City of Medford v. DiFilippo,1 the planning board, after public 
hearing, approved a subdivision showing a proposed way. Shortly 
thereafter the way was constructed in accordance with the plan, and 
the owners blocked off access to the way by constructing a fence. 
Without deciding the effect of an agreement made with the planning 
board under General Laws, Chapter 41, Section 81Q, as amended, or 
whether approval of a plan amounts to dedication of a way to public 
use, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the approyal of a sub-
division was based on the logical assumption that the way would be 
"made available at least for all reasonable travel and municipal and 
utility use in connection with, and for users to, the houses in the 
subdivision." 
§14.15. Subdivision plans recorded prior to subdivision control 
law: Exemptions. In Toothaker v. Planning Board of Billerica,1 the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that a subdivision recorded in 1914, 
prior to the effective date of the subdivision control law in Billerica, 
was subject to the provisions of the law. The Court further held that 
the only lots exempt from the law were those held in ownership 
separate and apart from the lots comprising the subdivision when the 
subdivision law went into effect in 1951 in Billerica. More important, 
the exemption under Section 81FF of "rights of way and other ease-
ments appurtenant to such lots" relates only to ways appurtenant to 
lots held separate and apart and does not relate to the ways generally 
nor to the ways appurtenant to lots not held in separate ownership. 
The effect of the decision is that ways shown on such a plan can only 
be used to service the lots held separate and apart and may not be 
used to service the remaining (non-exempt) lots held in common 
ownership. 
§14.16. Conditions: Imposition by planning board. In Rounds 
v. Board of Water & Sewer Commissioners of Wilmington,1 a subdivider 
having a disagreement with a "town water department which wanted 
to install additional water pipes, beyond the limits of the subdivision, 
2 G.L., c. 41, §§8IP, 8IBB. 
§I4.14. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 621, 197 N.E.2d 794. 
§I4.15. 1346 Mass. 436,193 N.E.2d 582 (1963). See G.L., c. 40, §8IFF. 
§I4.16. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 277, 196 N.E.2d 209. 
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as a condition of supplying service, waived his right to appeal when, 
pursuant to an approval of the subdivision, he executed a covenant 
with the planning board wherein he agreed to supply necessary 
utilities. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the subdivider, if 
he believed the requirement to be arbitrary, should have appealed 
under Section 8lBB of General Laws, Chapter 41, and presumably 
should have refused to execute the covenant wherein he agreed to 
comply with the water department's regulations and requirements. 
§14.17. Disapproval of preliminary plan: Effect on later filing of 
definitive plan. In Paul Livoli, Inc. v. Planning Board of Marl-
borough,1 the subdivider submitted a preliminary plan under the pro-
visions of General Laws, Chapter 41, Section 81S. The plan was 
disapproved by the planning board, which stated, "No definitive plan 
can be filed as a preliminary plan was turned down by vote of the 
Planning Board." The subdivider appealed the board's decision to 
the Superior Court under the provisions of Section 81BB of General 
Laws, Chapter 41, covering disapproval of the preliminary plan. The 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the provisions of Section 81BB only 
allow appeal to the Superior Court in the case of definit.ive plans and, 
further, that a bill in equity by way of appeal from a planning board 
decision disapproving a preliminary plan cannot be maintained. It 
also held that a planning board has no right to refuse to pass on a 
definitive plan submitted properly under Section 81 U merely because 
a preliminary plan has been disapproved. The requirements of a 
preliminary plan, within the meaning of Chapter 40, Section 7 A, and 
Chapter 41, Section 81Q, are defined in Section 81L of Chapter 41, and 
a preliminary plan must comply substantially with this definition. 
§14.18. Legislation. General Laws, Chapter 41, Section 810, has 
been amended by Acts of 1963, Chapter 804, which provided that a 
plan shall be considered submitted when it is delivered at a meeting 
of the board or when it is sent by registered mail to the planning 
board, in care of the city or town clerk. If so mailed, the date of 
mailing shall be the date of submission of the plan. The purpose of 
this amendment is to provide for situations prevalent in municipalities 
in which planning boards do not meet frequently, or meet informally, 
or without a quorum, and can therefore avail themselves of the excuse 
that a plan had not been validly submitted. 
General Laws, Chapter 41, Section 81S, was amended by Acts of 
1964, Chapter 105, Section I, which provides that the planning board 
notify the applicant and the clerk of the city or town by certified mail 
of its decision on a preliminary plan. 
Section 81U of General Laws, Chapter 41, was amended by Acts 
of 1964, Chapter 105, Section 2, which requires a health board or officer 
to give notice of its decision to one who has submitted a definitive plan 
for approval. Prior to this amendment a board or officer had merely 
to report its decision to the planning board. 
§14.17. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 625, 197 N.E.2d 785. 
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§14.19. Proposed legislation. An attempt was made to amend 
Section 81W of General Laws, Chapter 41, by spelling out the pro-
cedures by which a planning board could modify, amend, or rescind 
its approval of a plan of subdivision. At present planning boards 
follow the applicable provisions of the subdivision control law relat-
ing to the submission and approval of the plan of subdivision. It may 
thus be seen that the guidelines for changes to approved plans are 
in need of clarification. The vehicle for the attempted amendment 
was House Bill No. 572 of 1964, Section 1. 
Section 2 of that bill sought to amend Section 81W by providing 
that no register of deeds or recorder of the Land Court should accept 
for record changes in an approved plan of subdivision without a cer-
tificate from the clerk of the city or town stating that no notice of 
appeal was received during the twenty days following receipt and 
recording of the notice from the planning board of its modification, 
amendment, or rescission. 
C. URBAN RENEWAL 
§14.20. Rehabilitation. The extensive disruption of living pat-
terns and neighborhoods caused by land clearance and redevelopment 
has created a growing interest in salvaging residences and in improv-
ing neighborhoods without destroying them. The federal urban 
renewal program has encouraged conservation since 1954, each 
successive act more enthusiastically, but advance in the programs has 
been extremely slow. Mainly the problem has been financing re-
habilitation. Owners of housing suitable for conservation are usually 
either absentee landlords whose interest in improving their property 
is minimal or occupants whose credit does not permit them to obtain 
mortgage funds. In addition, conventional lenders often find these 
blighted areas poor credit risks. 
Acts of 1964, Chapter 721, establishes a rehabilitation program in 
the Commonwealth that will hopefully solve at least the financial prob-
lems. A fund, set up under the State Housing Board, has been made 
available to furnish low cost loans to owners of rehabilitation property 
through action of the pertinent local renewal or housing authority. 
The Local Public Authorities are also authorized to purchase or con-
demn property which owners are unwilling to rehabilitate, and, after 
rehabilitating the property to rent it to tenants with certain prescribed 
preferences for rentals or later purchase. In multifamily units a con-
dominium could be used as a device to permit several persons to reha-
bilitate or purchase. The board assumes, it seems most properly, that 
federal "write-down" provisions will apply to resale property, thus 
permitting federal subsidy of a portion of any loss upon resale. Re-
location of residents in a rehabilitation area could be done largely 
within the area, since relatively few living units would have to be 
empty at anyone time. 
This program shows imagination and common sense. The rela-
10
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tively small initial funds authorization - twenty million dollars-
may well act as seed money to encourage private lenders when it be-
comes apparent that an area is being substantially upgraded.1 
§14.21. Other legislation. Acts of 1964, Chapter 636, substantially 
reorganized those state agencies with land use and development func-
tions. The Department of Commerce and Development was created 
to absorb the functions of the old Department of Commerce, the State 
Housing Board, the Massachusetts Commission on Atomic Energy, the 
Mass Transportation Commission, and the Division of Urban and 
Industrial Renewal. These various related functions should be co-
ordinated, and this new department at least sets up machinery that 
offers this possibility. 
Urban renewal has destroyed roughly four times as many resi-
dences as it has replaced. The destroyed substandard properties, of 
course, were often the great source - if an undesirable one - of 
housing for low-income persons and families. The need for replace-
ment housing for all the displaced, but particularly for those whose 
housing opportunities are limited by prejudice, is becoming increas-
ingly obvious. Resolves of 1964, Chapter 107, created a special com-
mission to make a study of low-income housing. Early hearings 
indicate that imaginative and perhaps fruitful solutions of various 
types are being proposed. The somewhat deservedly poor reputation 
of public housing indicates that it alone is not the answer. Hopefully 
a number of solutions will be proposed and acted upon - proposals 
that will tend to preserve the concepts of economically and socially in-
tegrated neighborhoods rather than create new, if shiny, ghettos. 
D. EMINENT DOMAIN 
§14.22. Public purpose. Established Massachusetts doctrine re-
quires that a taking by eminent domain be for a predominantly 
public purpose; private benefits can be creat~d but they must be 
collateral and subordinate.1 Interpretation of this doctrine ,was one 
facet of the opinion in Robie v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority.2 
The Authority had taken the plaintiff's land to carry out an agree-
ment it had entered into with the New York Central and Boston and 
Maine Railroads. The parties had agreed that the railroads would 
sell certain land to the Authority and in tum the Authority would 
take certain other land (including the plaintiff's parcel) and give the 
railroads an easement for relocating the railroad yards on the rail-
road tract being purchased. The Supreme Judicial Court found the 
taking constitutional upon the authority of Meisel Press Mfg. Co. v. 
City of Boston,S in which a public transit company had taken land 
§14.20. 1 An excellent booklet discussing various conservation concepts is City 
of New York, City Planning Commission, Rehabilitation (1963). 
§14.22. 1 See, e.g., the discussions in 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§10.2, 13.8. 
21964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1067, 199 N.E.2d 914, also noted in §1l.6 supra. 
3272 Mass. 372, 172 N.E. 356 (1930). 
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to replace certain railroad facilities that had been on property taken 
for the transit system. The public purpose in maintaining adequate 
railroad facilities supported such a taking. 
In fact, both Robie and Meisel seem to be easy cases constitutionally, 
because of the obvious public purpose in providing railroad service. 
The more difficult problem in Robie was the authorization given the 
Authority to take abutting property to relocate railroad facilities. 
The Court, following the only truly sensible policy if the statute was 
to be interpreted rationally, held that "abutting" did not mean that 
each parcel taken had to be contiguous to the turnpike prior to the 
taking; it was enough if all the land taken was part of a contiguous 
whole when the taking was completed. Any other interpretation 
would have limited the taking authority through accidents of size 
and location of parcels adjacent to the right of way. 
§14.23. Compensable taking and damages. Two cases decided 
during the 1964 SURVEY year, having considerably different fact 
situations, considered issues of whether a compensable interest in 
land had been taken. Kahler v. Town of Marshfield1 involved the 
compensability of an attachment on land taken. The plaintiffs had 
brought an action against the landowner for money owing and had 
filed a copy of the writ in the appropriate registry. Under General 
Laws, Chapter 79, Section 3, the recording of the order of taking by 
the defendant town terminated the plaintiff's legal lien but gave rise 
to an equitable lien which would have been payable from the land-
owner's proceeds if they had been found in his control. But the 
landowner had wasted the funds and had been adjudged a bankrupt 
shortly after receiving the proceeds from the lard. Under those cir-
cumstances the Supreme Judicial Court held that the plaintiff could 
recover from the defendant, since it had made payment without 
considering the property right represented by the lien, the recording 
of which had given it constructive notice. The town also contended 
that the language of General Laws, Chapter 79, Sections 3 and 6, 
exempted it from the obligation to pay the plaintiff for the value of 
his interest. The Court, although rejecting the contention as a matter 
of statutory interpretation, noted that the town's proposed construc-
tion raised serious constitutional questions. 
Tassinari v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority2 was a more fascinat-
ing study of the complex problems involved in determining if 
proscribing certain types of uses of land constitutes a taking of an 
interest therein. General Laws, Chapter 79, Section 12, gives damages 
to a landowner whose land itself is not taken only if the injury 
suffered is "special and peculiar." In Hyde v. City of Fall Rivers the 
Court had held that changing a two-way street into a one-way street 
did not create special and peculiar damage. The Court considered 
§14.23. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 837, 198 N.E.2d 647. 
21964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 493, 197 N.E.2d 584. 
3189 Mass. 439, 75 N.E. 953 (1905). 
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that this damage was the same in kind as that suffered by the general 
public, although the degree of injury may have been substantially 
greater. In Tassinari the majority of the Court affirmed the integrity 
of the Hyde case distinction and denied recovery in a situation in 
which a tw~way street had been changed into a one-way street, im-
pairing the plaintiff's business which required vehicular access and 
from which the only manner of egress was by backing out.4 
Justice Cutter, in a courteous but penetrating dissent, excepted to 
the automatic application of the Hyde reasoning on these facts, even 
if the Court was unwilling to (ollow him in overruling the out-of-date 
concept upon which it was based. As he suggested, the only solution 
to the denial of a right of recovery for what is realistically, if not 
ritualistically, a denial of reasonable access is legislation. In the area 
of eminent domain the legislative pattern should be as complete as 
possible, so that both landowners and takers will have fairly detailed 
directions for the computation of amounts payable. This would tend, 
at lea&t, to reduce the number of disputes that have to be settled in 
court. But, on the other hand, legislation so 'detailed that it attempts 
to define the line between compensable and noncompensable limita-
tions of access would be largely an exercise in futility. If the Court 
continues to bind itself to interpretations of the statute that were 
made in an entirely different economic society, special and detailed 
legislation will be necessary. It must be repeated. however, that the 
legislature has the obligation to make the rules on compensation as 
detailed and exact as it can reasonably manage. within the limitations 
of drafting legislation meant to have broad application. But, unless 
an administrative body has the duty of making detailed applications 
of even a precise statute, the courts have the obligation to legislate 
interstitially in the light of the conditions the legislation must now 
meet.1i . 
§14.24. Conflict between agencies with eminent domain powers. 
When one agency with eminent domain power has possession of cer-
tain land which another such agency wishes to obtain, determination 
of priority under Commonwealth statutes has often been uncertain. 
The basic problem has been discussed in earlier volumes of the SUR-
VEy.1 Two 1964 SURVEY year cases also dealt with the same general 
issues. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority v. Commonwealth2 in-
4 An interesting recent case of similar import, and with strong dissent, is Sta·te v. 
Masheter, 1 Ohio St. 2d 11, 203 N.E.2d 325 (1964), a case involving the compen-
sability of a loss of access to a marine terminal when a low bridge was built 
between it and the harbor entrance. 
Ii Thus, for example, the complex federal tax laws have required even more 
complex regulations, and still much of the determination of ,the law is left to 
court decision. The courts, after a somewhat false start, have been enterprising 
in carrying out the intent of tax legislation, judging that intent, at least in part, 
by contemporary tax and property concepts, not necessarily as those concepts existed 
at the time of the adoption of the original statutory language. 
§14.24. 1 See 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.9; 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §U.15. 
21964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 849, 199 N.E.2d 175. 
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volved the taking by the Department of Public Works of certain land 
belonging to the Authority. The Authority sought damages under 
General Laws, Chapter 79. The Supreme Judicial Court found, how-
ever, that damages were to be determined under Acts of 1955, Chapter 
693, Section 1, and Acts of 1957, Chapter 657. The Court found 
that the Authority was, for these purposes, a municipal corporation 
subject to these special acts governing compensation by the state for 
land taken from municipal corporations and similar governmental 
agencies.s The special exception for the Authority in the 1955 act 
was interpreted, from very cloudy language, as confined to takings 
by the Authority, and not from the Authority. 
Town of Somerset v. Dighton Water District4 involved a dispute 
over water rights. The petitioner town successfully sought declaratory 
relief to have the exclusive right to use the waters and watershed of 
a river located in Dighton. The town had used an area in Dighton 
as a well site since 1927 and in 1961 commenced steps to improve its 
water supply from the river sources. The defendant district, knowing 
in 1961-1962 of the plaintiff's plan to purchase additional properties 
to use for a reservoir and water source, held an emergency meeting 
and adopted an order of taking of the waters of the river involved. 
This order was recorded before the plaintiff had completed the actions 
relating to its reservoir and other water supply plans. 
The act establishing the water district limited its rights to those 
water supplies in the town "not already appropriated and used for 
the purposes of a public water supply." However, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court interpreted the "and" in this phrase disjunctively (i.e., to 
mean or); it then went on to state further that if the meaning of "ap-
propriated" is limited to "used," the plaintiff town had appropriated 
the river waters, because the findings of the court below were that 
the town was using the water. Upon this interpretation, the district 
was unable to prevail over the plaintiff town under the powers given 
it in the act setting it up. 
§14.25. Severance damages. It is elementary law that when a 
portion of a tract of land is taken, compensation should include not 
only the market value of the property taken, but also the diminution 
in value of the portion not taken. Application of this rule concern-
ing severance damages, however, is often not elementary, and the 
1964 SURVEY year case of Valley Paper Co. v. Holyoke Housing Author-
ityl affords an excellent illustration. The Authority took a tract of 
the petitioner's land that was separated by a canal and street from 
the land upon which the company's main plant was located. The 
company, however, did have a right to bridge the canal at any time 
and also the right to use the canal for mill power. The tract taken 
3 City of Worcester v. Commonwealth, 345 Mass. 99, 185 N.E.2d 633 (1962), 
therefore applied. 
41964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1097,200 N.E.2d 237. 
§14.25. 1346 Mass. 561, 194 N.E.2d 700 (1963), also noted in §14.26 infra. 
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had been vacant for some years after its use for employee housing 
had been discontinued. The lower court had refused to accept the 
testimony of a witness concerning the use of the taken tract in future 
expansion of the company. 
In an excellent opinion the Court upheld the refusal of the lower 
court to permit testimony on this issue but carefully noted that it 
supported the refusal because no proper basis for treating the taken 
tract and the plant land as one parcel had been established in prior 
testimony - nor was it even included in the offer of proof. But the 
opinion discussed authorities from other jurisdictions as well as the 
tendencies in earlier Massachusetts cases, and concluded that severance 
damages may be awarded when a parcel taken by eminent domain is 
noncontiguous to other property of the landowner if four conditions 
are met: (1) the land taken must have been held for expansion of 
the business conducted upon the owner's remaining land; (2) it must 
be adaptable for this expansion; (3) it must be likely to be used for 
expansion purposes reasonably soon, so that the time of use is not so 
remote as to be speculative; and (4) the taking must adversely affect 
the market value of the remaining land. Of course, these four state-
ments can constitute no check-off list and each requires careful proof. 
The· Court's opinion, although following the better view in the 
light of modem authority, is indicative of the problems a taking can 
create for the taker. The parcel taken in Valley was one of several 
basically similar parcels but, because it was owned by the paper com-
pany, the taking authority might well have had to pay approximately 
ten times as much for this parcel as it would have for otherwise 
essentially similar adjoining parcels, if they too were vacant.2 
§14.26. Evidence. Several points concerning the evidence of value 
acceptable in the trial of an eminent domain suit were decided during 
the 1964 SURVEY year. In Valley Paper Co. v. Holyoke Housing 
Authority,l the lower court had accepted evidence of sales of certain 
properties as comparable and thus helpful in determining the value 
of the land taken in this case. The Supreme Judicial Court held that 
evidence of sales of other tracts of land, similar except that they had 
no water rights, was acceptable since the company had not used any 
mill power under its water rights for over eighty years. Thus the 
lower court judge could reasonably conclude that these rights had no 
practical effect on the locus value. The admission by the lower court 
of evidence of the sale of property more markedly dissimilar was 
sustained, although the Court recognized that the differences were 
so substantial that the evidence would be of little value. The Court 
not~d the wide range of judicial discretion on this issue and also noted 
2 Damages of $25,000 were awarded. The rejected testimony valued the total 
loss at $262,000. One point to consider, however, is that the land was probably 
empty only because the paper company owned it; another owner might well have 
built upon it and the taker would then have had to pay the value of improvements. 
§14.26. 1346 Mass. 561, 194 N.E.2d 700 (1963). 
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that the judge had stated that he would instruct the jury on the 
testimonial weakness of this evidence. 
Consolini v. Commonwealth2 also settled a problem raised by evi-
dence of comparable sales. Here the lower court refused to accept 
evidence of the sale of two tracts of gravel-bearing land, one of one-
fifth acre and the other of forty acres, as comparable for determining 
the value of the eleven-acre locus. The Supreme Judicial Court re-
versed, since the nature and the use of land were almost completely 
similar, and the difference in area, in this type of land use, created 
no plottage value dependent upon size. 
The lower court had also excluded evidence in Consolini of the 
value of the gravel as it lay in the bank and of the payments pre-
scribed in a royalty agreement operating at the time of taking. The 
Supreme Judicial Court noted that the question of admissability of 
such evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge, who might 
well feel that the evidence could be confusing and speculative. Of 
course, as the Court noted, such evidence can be admitted.8 In fact, 
in a situation in which evidence of comparable sales is not available 
and the product is sufficiently scarce in the area so that land values 
generally do not reflect its presence on other land, the value of a 
mineral and of royalty agreements concerning it may be the only 
possible evidence by which to determine the value of a parcel being 
taken. 
§14.27. Eminent domain proceedings. The tremendous increase 
in eminent domain takings has resulted in a great backlog of cases in 
the Attorney General's office and in the courts. The injustice to 
landowners of long delays and inadequate administrative awards, 
coupled with the clogging effect on an already overcrowded court 
system, has resulted in much proposed legislation, some of which was 
adopted during the 1964 SURVEY year. 
The major act adopted was Acts of 1964, Chapter 579. Section I 
of this act amended General Laws, Chapter 79, Section 3, to clarify 
that the taker's recording of his order transfers title to him, at which 
point the prior owner's right to damages immediately arises; the 
amendment also removes certain exceptions to this general rule. Sec-
tion 2 of the act replaces Section 6 of General Laws, Chapter 79, with 
a new section that requires all takers to award damages at the time 
of taking. 
Section 3 of Acts of 1964, Chapter 579, contains the major changes 
in taking procedure. It adds Sections 7A through 7G to General Laws, 
Chapter 79. Section 7A requires at least one appraisal before an 
administrative award for damages is made, thereby making the nomi-
nal damage award (one dollar or so) no longer possible. Section 7B 
2346 Mass. 501, 194 N.E.2d 407 (1963). 
8 The Court cited Wellington v. City of Cambridge, 220 Mass. 312, 318, 107 N.E. 
976, 977 (1915); Providence &: Worcester R.R. v. City of Worcester, 155 Mass. 35, 
29 N.E. 56 (1891). 
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requires prompt action by the taking agency to assure that the damages 
awarded under the order of taking are fully available to the person 
whose property was taken. Prompt payment, of course, also avoids 
high interest awards. Section 7C. through 7E make provisions for 
giving notice to persons with interests in the land taken and for 
solving the problems arising when the owners of interests cannot be 
determined or located. These provisions are somewhat complicated 
and it will be interesting to observe if they will work adequately in 
actual practice. Section 7G provides that the owner of interests can 
accept the amount of the administrative award without waiving any 
rights to proceed for a larger award. This provision is, of course, 
designed to remove the pressure on the necessitous owner whose land 
has been taken and to reduce interest payments by the taker. 
Section lOA provides that a writ of mandamus can be brought 
against anyone who has duties under the new taking procedure, 
thus furnishing a self-help device that was not available before. This 
relieves the Attorney-General, whose office had the sole policing duty 
up to this time. The final new section, Section 36A, requires pay-
ment within thirty days after all rights of appeal have been exhausted 
or waived. 
This new act is obviously salutary, but any such radical change 
will create some difficulties. If the Section 7A approval, for example, 
is near the tax assessment figure, the possibility of over- or under-
assessment can create problems of excess or inadequate administrative 
damages; and yet this summary appraisal may be the only one practi-
cable for a taking agency. Nearly ten percent of property taken has 
serious title problems, often due to the failure of present possessors 
to have obtained probate of the prior owner's estate, thus leaving 
title under a cloud that must be removed. Thus, amendments to, 
and modifications of, the present act will certainly be adopted, but 
the general policy of the new act will certainly remain a part of 
the law. 
§14.28. Additional protection to persons affected by the taking of 
property. The new taking procedure, largely designed to strengthen 
the position of the owner vis-a-vis the taker, has been supplemented 
by further legislation during the 1964 SURVEY year. Section 8B was 
added to General Laws, Chapter 79, by Acts of 1964, Chapter 633. 
This new section gives the person in lawful possession of taken 
property four months to vacate after notice of the taking, if the 
property is used for residential or business purposes. 
Acts of 1963, Chapter 843, created Section 6A in General Laws, 
Chapter 79, authorizing relocation payments to the occupants in all 
takings. This section essentially solves the financial problems of 
relocation, but all studies indicate that the social problems are both 
more important and pervasive and also the most difficult to resolve 
adequately. 
Acts of 1963, Chapter 793, and Acts of 1964, Chapters 478 and 548, 
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all provide for interest on damage awards against various takers 
and under various procedures at six percent rather than at four 
percent as was formerly required. Interest against the state is also 
now authorized. 
Acts of 1964, Chapter 457, inserted Section 35A in General Laws, 
Chapter 79, providing for court apportionment of t.axes after a 
jury award of damages in a Section 14 damages proceeding. 
Acts of 1964, Chapter 448, amends various acts to provide that if 
the Real Estate Review Board determines a property value at an 
amount below the lowest appraisal of the Department of Public 
Works and also more than ten percent below the amount determined 
by the reviewing appraiser in the department, the Board shall set 
out the reasons for this difference in detail in its report. 
E. OTHER LAND USE MATTERS 
§14.29. Nuisance: Public regulations. In two cases decided by 
the Supreme Judicial Court during the 1964 SURVEY year, the main 
issue turned upon the validity of public regulations concerning nui-
sances or prospective nuisances. In each case the regulation was 
upheld. 
Moysenko v. Board of Health of North Andover1 involved the appli-
cation of typical regulations forbidding piggeries within a town.2 
The petitioners, who had maintained a piggery in the town for a 
number of years, filed this petition to annul a Board order prohibiting 
their piggery.3 The lower court refused to grant an instruction 
sought by the petitioner that the order of prohibition would be un-
reasonable and arbitrary if issued without knowledge of the conditions 
at the particular piggery. The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the 
lower court's refusal to grant this instruction. The enabling statute 
under which the Board adopted its prohibition of piggeries, General 
Laws, Chapter 111, Section 143, is expressed in terms of reasonable 
possibility that the trade could result in a nuisance or could be at-
tended by noisome and injurious odors. Thus the Board's order was 
valid if conceivably there were circumstances under which the exercise 
of the occupation might become a nuisance" The Court found it 
common knowledge that the objectionable conditions referred to in 
the enabling act attend the operation of some piggeries. This was 
sufficient to sustain the order of prohibition, no proof being required 
that the individual piggery had the offensive characteristics. 
General Laws, Chapter 111, Section 150A, gives a board of health 
(and the Department of Health) power to rescind any permit for the 
§14.29. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 589, 197 N.E.2d 679. 
2 The Court cited Cochis v. Board of Heahh of Canton, 332 Mass. 721, 127 N.E.2d 
575 (1955), and Board of Health of Franklin v. Hass, 342 Mass. 421, 173 N.E.2d 
808 (1961), as involving similar typical regulations. 
3 G.L., c. Ill, §I46. 
4 Waltham v. Mignosa, 327 Mass. 250, 252,98 N.E.2d 495,496 (1951). 
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use of a location for a refuse disposal incinerator. In MacDonald 
v. Board of Health of Braintree5 the Court sustained the rescission 
order made by the respondent Board. The part of the opinion that 
discussed the statute is a far from unique example of the Court's 
ability to use common sense to interpret a cloudy statute. The peti-
tioners had the better argument on the statutory wording, but the 
general purpose of the act is better effectuated by the somewhat 
strained meaning the Court gave the statute, permitting the purpose 
of the act to control over technicalities of language. Courts certainly 
have the function of legislating interstitially as a function of partic-
ularizing the broad general language of a statute. But the Court 
might consider if its generosity in accepting sloppy and inadequate 
legislative draftsmanship does not encourage the adoption and re-
tention of statutes that are inadequate guides to behavior even when 
a lawyer's advice is sought. The regulation of piggeries should hardly 
be the relatively major source of litigation that it has proved to be. 
A narrow statutory policy should be expressed in readily compre-
hensible terms. It is only the broad policies - whether statutory or 
constitutional- that should require the creative interstitial legislating 
that is a court's most important function. 
MacDonald also represents still another case in which the Court 
had to note that the wrong remedy (here, certiorari) had been sought, 
there being a statutory remedy in equity provided for in General 
Laws, Chapter 111, Section 150A. Depending upon one's point of 
view, this problem of the wrong choice of remedy reflects upon 
either the competence of lawyers or the obsolescence of the procedural 
system. This writer opts for the latter.6 
§14.30. Pollution, waste, and natural resources. Our increasingly 
urbanized and complex society produces ever more pollution and 
waste as each year passes. Obvious health hazards are becoming 
crucial, as air becomes more polluted by chemicals and impurities 
and water becomes more befouled by sewage and industrial waste. 
Less obvious but equally critical problems of mental health are also 
arising because of the lack of open space to give relief from the 
pressures of urban living and the constant human contact it involves. 
Legislatures are becoming vitally interested in these problems and 
the General Court had a busy year in 1964 on these issues. 
Two Resolves of 1964, Chapters 89 and 100, relate to air pollution. 
Chapter 89 directs the Department of Public Health to study the 
problem of air pollution within the Metropolitan Air Pollution Con-
trol District (Greater Boston) and adjacent areas. The Department 
is to report to the legislature and it may make legislative recommenda-
51964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 319. 196 N.E.2d 646. 
8 Another such case. involving ,the establishment of a public way. was Denman v. 
County of Barnstable. 346 Mass. 412. 193 N.E.2d 572 (1963). In that case a bill 
in equity was brought to challenge the legality of the establishment of the way. 
a1though on appeal all parties conceded. and the Court agreed. that certiorari was 
the proper remedy. 
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tions. Chapter 100 authorizes a special commission to study the en-
forcement of present laws governing air pollution. 
Problems of water pollution and sewage disposal resulted in addi-
tional legislation. Broader powers to adopt regulations on water 
pollution were given to the Department of Public Health by Acts of 
1964, Chapter 16. Broad powers to construct and operate a sewerage 
system were given, by Chapter 736 of Acts of 1964, to municipalities. 
Resolves of 1964, Chapter 110, continues the special commission 
studying water pollution, and Chapter 78 of the Resolves includes 
pollution abatement as one of the functions to be considered in a 
Charles River general plan to be established by the Metropolitan 
District Commission. 
Acts of 1964, Chapter 643, governs procedures for water favorability 
studies to be conducted upon application of municipalities and dis-
tricts. The problems of solid waste disposal in Metropolitan Boston 
are referred to a study by the Commissioner of Administration by 
Resolves of 1964, Chapter 144. 
More affirmative issues of preservation of the Commonwealth's 
present resources are covered in two other statutes. Acts of 1964, 
Chapter 507, authorizes the Department of Natural Resources to ex-
pend funds for improvement of the state's recreation areas. Acts of 
1964, Chapter 234, makes some change in the authorization given 
municipalities under General Laws, Chapter 40, Section 5(51), to 
expend funds for natural resource development. 
The extent of the legislation and the number of studies suggests 
that the legislature recognizes the extent of these problems. However, 
serious thought should be given to coordinating projects and pro-
grams. If the future costs of these programs will be equivalent to 
the present costs of our highway system, early planning for coordinated 
and cooperative efforts can assure an effective program at minimum 
costs. 
§14.31. Regional planning. The regional planning enabling 
statute of the Commonwealth, General Laws, Chapter 40B, is 
rather unique in that it has not been amended since it became effec-
tive some ten years ago. This may well attest more to a lack of real 
use of the statute than to the prescience of the redactors. Be that as 
it may, the statute was amended during the 1964 SURVEY year. The 
new Department of Commerce and Development is given the power 
to define and redefine the planning regions of the Commonwealth. 
Section 3 of General Laws, Chapter 40B, thus removes from the cities 
and towns the power to determine planning district limits, although 
it does not restrict their discretion in becoming members of such dis-
tricts. Section 4 of General Laws, Chapter 40B, was amended to 
clarify the method of determining the representative of each city and 
town. An addition to Section 7 of the act, which governs the fiscal 
program of the districts, authorizes a district to contract with the 
federal government, or with a city or town within the district, for 
planning studies to the extent of the appropriated funds. 
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